




END OF AN ERA, PART IV:

KINGMAKERS & KINGDOMS

BY NATHAN WALKER

SEPTEMBER 14, 2026

PART IV



3,866 WORDS / 38 NOTES

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THE REPORT

KINGMAKERS & KINGDOMS

END OF AN ERA, PART IV

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Footnote numbers in the report correspond to the complete end notes and retained public links.

SECTION 1

THE STRAW, THE CAMEL'S BACK

At 7:15 on the morning of September 11, Khalid al-Mihdhar checked in for American Airlines Flight 77 at Washington Dulles. Nawaf al-Hazmi followed minutes later. At 9:37:46, their aircraft struck the Pentagon. NORAD's Northeast sector had never been told that Flight 77 was hijacked. It learned by chance at 9:34 only that the aircraft was missing, then received at most one or two minutes' warning of an unidentified plane approaching Washington. The institution expected to defend the country met the plot almost at the moment of impact.¹

From 1996 through 1999, John Brennan served as CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia. During that date range, Jeddah consular officers approved visas for Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. The CIA's station ran out of the same U.S. Embassy in Riyadh. A 2021 military-commission defense declaration records a former FBI agent's belief that Hazmi's and Mihdhar's visas facilitated a Saudi GID-CIA operation. Surveillance of the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur exposed Mihdhar's multiple-entry visa; by March, CIA knew Hazmi had entered Los Angeles. An FBI detailee's January report for Bureau channels was marked "hold off" at the Bin Laden Unit deputy chief's instruction and never released. The FBI received the travel information that August.²

Hazmi and Mihdhar meanwhile settled in San Diego, where Omar al-Bayoumi helped them find an apartment and they later rented a room from an active FBI informant. The Bureau says it discovered those relationships after the attacks. The July 2001 Phoenix memorandum raised the possibility that bin Laden was sending students into American aviation schools; its recommendations were not acted upon. In August, Minneapolis agents detained Zacarias Moussaoui after his simulator training raised hijacking concerns, but did not search his computer before September 11.³

The fragmented intelligence never outlined the whole plot, but NSA had indeed already linked Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi to a possible operational cadre. The 9/11 Commission later found related identifiers in NSA databases, some reported and some not.² The government had collected names, travel, associations, aviation warnings and investigative suspicions, but control, compartmentation and priority kept them from becoming timely operational knowledge. On the morning itself, the military received no warning of United 175 before impact, no hijack warning for Flight 77, and notice of United 93 only after it had crashed.¹ It was the decisive recipient of a picture no institution had assembled and delivered.


The relevant intelligence was not passed along, subverting regular official process. Three days later, the federal response converted those exposed failures into a claim for expanded authority. On September 14, Proclamation 7463 declared an emergency dating from the attacks and activated sweeping executive powers that closed some gaps, but not all.⁴

THE STRAW, THE CAMEL'S BACK

NAMES • TRAVEL • SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATIONS • AVIATION WARNINGS

LEGEND

- NEGATIVE
- POSITIVE
- NEUTRAL / CONTEXT



[2] DOJ OIG FBI INTELLIGENCE REVIEW • 9/11 COMMISSION / CHAPTERS 6 + 11

[3] 9/11 COMMISSION / CHAPTERS 7-8 • DOJ OIG PHOENIX + MOUSSAOUI REVIEWS

PART II • WEN HO LEE SOURCE 36 • BOEING / HUGHES SOURCES 18-19

PART III • NOTE 11 • PRE-TRANSFER BOEING / MESA SOURCE NOTE 22

CONTINUED

Much of the machinery predated September 11. Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994, making lawful-intercept capability a hard-wired component of commercial telecommunications networks. InfraGard connected the FBI to companies and universities. After 9/11, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) grew from 35 to 103 by March 2005; more than half their 5,085 members came from outside the FBI.²⁴

The financial backdoor was personnel. The CIA approved Ronald Rewald as a contact and used his investment business to backstop covert officers after waiving a full background check despite derogatory information; he was later convicted on ninety-four fraud and related counts. Kamal Adham, CIA's former principal Middle East liaison, fronted BCCI's secret acquisition of First American and pleaded guilty. A Senate investigation found that CIA knew of BCCI's criminality and hidden ownership but did not give the Federal Reserve or Justice Department the information needed to act.²⁵ These were not isolated outsiders slipping through procedural cracks; official positions and acknowledged relationships supplied the access.

USAID supplied another financial route. Michael Hase, a thirty-year USAID accountant and its Armenia mission controller, redirected payments due through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and an Armenian bank into his own account. He pleaded guilty to theft and filing a false tax return; his plea also disclosed a hidden UBS account. Inside CIA itself, the same personnel gate failed at senior level: David Rush reached Senior

Executive Service and held TS/SCI access after applications claimed degrees from Clemson and Rensselaer that neither school could verify. In 2026, FBI agents recovered 303 gold bars worth more than \$40 million, roughly \$2 million in cash and about 35 luxury watches from his home; the affidavit says his employer had supplied the gold and foreign currency for work expenses.²⁵

The contractor layer supplied structural access. At Leon Panetta's 2009 confirmation hearing, Dianne Feinstein said the intelligence-contractor workforce doubled from 2001 to 2006 and most had been hired after 9/11. In 2006, the FBI awarded Lockheed Martin \$305 million to build Sentinel, its electronic case-management, evidence, workflow, search and information-sharing system. Its oversight office-covering cost, schedule, performance, requirements, risk and acceptance-planned 74 percent contractor staffing; Booz Allen Hamilton independently reviewed Phase 1.²⁶

In 2005, the FBI created a National Security Higher Education Advisory Board with leaders from Johns Hopkins, Carnegie Mellon, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Texas A&M, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and the University of California San Diego (UC San Diego).²⁷ Those same universities recur throughout this series in formal partnerships with Chinese institutions tied to advanced, dual-use and defense research.²⁷

SECTION 2

KEEPING THE DATA ROLLING



The joint inspectors-general report documents how threat assessments sustained repeated renewals of the President's Surveillance Program. President George W. Bush signed the first authorization October 4, 2001, permitting specified NSA surveillance inside the United States without Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders. Between then and December 8, 2006, he signed 43 authorizations, generally at intervals of about 45 days. The relevant activities moved under FISA authority in January 2007.²⁹

CIA terrorism analysts wrote the renewal threat assessments without initially knowing the program or their work's purpose. John H. Moseman, then Tenet's chief of staff, added a paragraph-language he recalled receiving from either Alberto Gonzales or David Addington-asserting a continuing domestic threat and recommending renewal. CIA lawyers judged whether drafts made a compelling case and requested additional information or revisions when they did not.²⁹

Although no law required it, the Attorney General's certification reassured NSA and participating private-sector personnel. Alberto Gonzales said it also had prospective value, for "purely political considerations," if Congress or an inspector general examined the program.²⁹

NSA-derived leads reached FBI offices without their protected source or full context. Agents said most had no connection to terrorism but pursued every one because a single genuine lead could matter. The inspectors general found the program played only a limited role in the FBI's counterterrorism work.²⁹

When Justice Department lawyers later concluded that parts of the program lacked a viable legal basis, Robert Mueller and James Comey were prepared to resign. The program was instead modified.²⁹

The machinery created three "backdoors." Hardware embedded access in CALEA intercepts, switching equipment, servers, technical standards, supply chains and research routes. Personnel and red tape determined who could use that capacity and receive its products through clearances, compartments, detailees, contractors, banking posts, task-force seats, universities, think tanks and routing rules. Before 9/11, CIA's Bin Laden Unit blocked an FBI detailee's warning to the Bureau about Mihdhar's visa.²

The legal backdoor supplied permission, secrecy and duration. The National Emergency, Authorization for Use of Military Force, PATRIOT mechanisms, President's Surveillance Program and later FISA revisions were separate authorities with separate limits.⁵ Together they expanded collection, retention, sharing and action while moving decisions away from ordinary public process. Exceptionally restricted access to the surveillance program also impaired legal review.²⁹

The three depended on one another: technical access, authorized personnel and legal permission. Together they created conditions for failure, coerced compromises, private profit, demands for greater authority and expansion of each authority granted. September 11 opened the legal door; the hardware and personnel infrastructure already existed.

KEEPING THE DATA ROLLING

Threat assessments sustained repeated renewals of the President's Surveillance Program

01 / ACCESS WITHOUT COURT ORDER

SURVEILLANCE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT A FISC ORDER [29]

JOINT IG REPORT / PRINTED P. 5

As explained below, the PSP expanded the NSA's authority by allowing it to conduct electronic surveillance within the United States without an order from the FISC when certain factual conditions and legal standards were met.

02 / REAUTHORIZATION

ABOUT EVERY 45 DAYS [29]

THREAT ASSESSMENT + DOJ LEGAL REVIEW

JOINT IG REPORT / PRINTED P. 6

The Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately every 45 days. As described in the next section, with each reauthorization the CIA and later the NCTC prepared an assessment of current potential terrorist threats and a summary of intelligence gathered through the PSP and other means during the previous authorization period.

03 / ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIFICATION

NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT "PURELY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS" [29]

JOINT IG REPORT / PRINTED P. 7

Although there was no legal requirement that the Authorizations be certified by the Attorney General or other Department of Justice official, current and former DOJ officials told us that this certification added value by giving the program a sense of legitimacy. Former Attorney General

SAME PAGE / INTERVENING MATERIAL OMITTED

Attorney General had approved the program. In addition, Gonzales said that for "purely political considerations" the Attorney General's approval of the program would have value "prospectively" in the event of congressional or inspector general reviews of the program.

04 / THE FBI RESULT

MOST PSP LEADS: NO TERRORISM CONNECTION GENERALLY A LIMITED ROLE [29]

JOINT IG REPORT / PRINTED PP. 32-33

forward." Even though most PSP leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism, many of the FBI witnesses believed the mere possibility of the leads producing useful information made investigating the leads worthwhile.

NEXT PAGE / DOJ OIG CONCLUSION

In sum, the DOJ OIG found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall effectiveness of the PSP program as it relates to the FBI's counterterrorism activities. However, based on the interviews conducted and documents reviewed, the DOJ OIG concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts.

[29] Inspectors General of DOJ, DOD, CIA, NSA and ODNI, Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program, July 10, 2009, pp. 1-11, 27-36; CIA Office of Inspector General, Review of the President's Surveillance Program, Volume II, pp. 7-8.

SECTION 3

THE BELGRADE CHAIN REACTION



From 1998 through 2001, Solar Sunrise struck Defense networks; Melissa and LoveLetter disrupted email; Code Red, Code Red II and Nimda exploited vulnerable Internet-connected systems. Together they formed the contested technical environment surrounding the State, USAID, academic, industrial, Silicon Valley, In-Q-Tel, Chinese-investment and personnel channels traced earlier. Michigan State routing research yielded a commercial network emulator and a Chinese venture jointly funded by Michigan-based CC&T and China Sanjiang Aerospace. A December 2000 Chinese report said a National Defence University network attack-and-defense system had passed appraisal after four years—an inferred 1996-2000 development window.⁶ Sanjiang was CASIC's Base 066, a designer and producer of the DF-11 ballistic-missile system.⁶


Twenty-eight months before September 11, a B-2 crew struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade at coordinates from a CIA-assembled target package cleared through military review; the crew did not choose the target.⁷

CIA originated and wholly assembled the target package for Yugoslavia's Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement. Unable to find the building on available maps, an officer used field-navigation methods and assigned the Chinese embassy's coordinates to a military-procurement office roughly three hundred meters away. Three CIA meetings reviewed the nomination without examining his geolocation method. Intelligence and military databases still carried the embassy's old address, so their checks returned the same answer. The coordinates acquired what George Tenet later called the "mantle of fact."⁷

A second CIA officer encountered the nomination by chance, remembered material placing the target elsewhere and called the military targeting cell in Naples three days before the strike. He then found information supporting the discrepancy. The warning crossed one compartment of the system, changed meaning at the CIA-military boundary and never reached an official able to stop the geopolitically doomed mission.⁷

THE BELGRADE CHAIN REACTION

THE COORDINATES CAME FROM CIA. THE AIRCREW DID NOT CHOOSE THE TARGET



[7] George Tenet, “DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, open hearing, July 22, 1999; CIA, “Improving the Intelligence Community’s No-Strike Target Support,” Studies in Intelligence, 12 pp., doc. 0006122212; ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, Final Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FRY, June 13, 2000, paras. 80–85.

CONTINUED

Belgrade also sat inside an electronic battlespace. A joint *Observer-Politiken* investigation cited anonymous NATO and intelligence sources alleging that the embassy rebroadcast Yugoslav military traffic after another transmitter was destroyed; witnesses also described Yugoslav military contact with the compound.⁸ No released signal record has settled the allegation, and a competing account placed the transmissions at Hotel Yugoslavia. The relay remains unresolved and does not by itself explain the strike.


As traced earlier in this series, reporting placed CIA officers among the 1998-99 cease-fire monitors, cultivating and advising the U.S.-backed, predominantly secular Albanian-nationalist KLA; a commander described earlier meetings with American agents in northern Albania.⁹ A smaller, mistrusted foreign-mujahideen current entered the same theater. In *United States v. Jayyousi*, Mohamed Hesham Youssef called from Albania and Kosovo while Adham Hassoun arranged money and discussed Jose Padilla's travel. Another federal record placed Wa'el Julaidan at the head of a Saudi relief body in Kosovo; Treasury linked him to bin Laden's network.⁹ These overlaps did not make the KLA al-Qaeda; they placed American power, irregular fighters, Saudi intermediaries and Middle Eastern militant networks in the same theater.

Tenet accepted responsibility for the intelligence failure; Defense for dropping the bombs; the international review treated the aircrew as blameless because it received the wrong target. The error originated upstream, but the military inherited the public fallout with China while U.S.-Chinese technical channels continued. A State-chaired meeting then set a "rollout strategy" covering political and military briefings, congressional timing, compensation and accountability.¹⁰

Within days, CIA sources reported an unusually strong opportunity to strike Osama bin Laden near Kandahar. CIA and military officials later disputed which institution doubted the intelligence and which refused the risk. A military officer remembered the Pentagon prepared to fire; the CIA's bin Laden unit ironically feared the Agency would be left to "hang alone" if the missiles missed. The 9/11 Commission said Belgrade scrutiny may have increased caution. Newly released Clarke interviews record Tenet demanding greater confidence and State officials fearing a "bomb-happy" reputation.¹¹ The next decision again paired an intelligence service fearing another miss with a military dependent on intelligence it did not control.

WHY BELGRADE MATTERED AT KANDAHAR

PENTAGON WEARS THE SCARS • BIN LADEN-NETWORK EVIDENCE IN THE BALKAN THEATER •
CIA-MILITARY DEPENDENCY AT KANDAHAR



[7] Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, July 22, 1999 statement – <https://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/tenet722.htm>; CIA, no-strike study – https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006122212.pdf; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, bombing review – https://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf.
[9] Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty, "CIA Aided Kosovo Guerrilla Army" – <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/ksv17.htm>, The Sunday Times, March 12, 2000, archived by Global Policy Forum; United States v. Jayyousi, Eleventh Circuit opinion – <https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/200810494.pdf>; DOJ chronology – https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2005/01/01/2005-0533_resp.pdf; Kadi v. Geithner, administrative record – <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1-09-cv-00108/pdf/USCOURTS-dcd-1-09-cv-00108-0.pdf>; Treasury, Julaidan designation – <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/po3397>.
[10] CIA, memorandum recording the State-chaired rollout meeting – <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001081818>.
[11] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Report, Chapter 4 – https://911commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch4.htm; National Archives, Richard Clarke interview Document 2 – <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2026-201-document-2-release-508.pdf> and Document 3 – <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2026-201-document-3-release-508.pdf>.

SECTION 4

PENTAGON WEARS THE SCARS

IV

After September 11, the CIA-military dependency exposed at Belgrade became the operating structure of the war in Afghanistan. American policy had previously built-and then removed-a thin institutional scaffold there. In 1987, it sought Afghan capacity in agriculture, medicine, education and public administration; USAID's cross-border machinery helped Afghan organizations perform what its own design called the civil functions of government.¹²

American arms to the resistance and Soviet arms to Kabul ended on January 1, 1992, before the Islamic State of Afghanistan was formally constituted. When the communist government fell, USAID redirected portions of its remaining resistance-era machinery toward the new state: education planning, textbooks, teacher training, public-health administration, immunization, agricultural extension, procurement, budgeting and regional services.¹³ Congress then required USAID to shrink its worldwide mission network. Administrator J. Brian Atwood's agency chose Afghanistan, cancelled intended successor programs and closed the bilateral development machinery during 1994.¹⁴

Relief continued through other channels. Afghan ministries, communities, NGOs and United Nations agencies preserved parts of the system; Iran and Russia continued supporting the Rabbani-Massoud side. Civil war, factional collapse and government failure had their own causes. American records nevertheless identify

the capacity that disappeared. Supported health staffing fell from 5,363 workers to 1,905 by closeout, while basic health posts fell from 2,271 to 982. Teacher salaries ended, successor care was cancelled, institutional systems remained unfinished, and the USAID mission responsible for sustaining and monitoring them closed while Pakistani support for the Taliban intensified.¹³

Washington returned through its surviving intelligence contact with Massoud's network. CIA officer Gary Schroen recalled that the government had declined the fuller pre-9/11 relationship with Massoud he advocated while preserving limited contact. After Massoud's assassination and the September 11 attacks, Schroen was ordered to join his surviving network, prepare the battlefield and help bring in American Special Forces.¹⁵ That limited foothold became the opening through which CIA and the military reentered Afghanistan.

The Taliban gave bin Laden sanctuary, but the target network crossed Afghanistan's borders. Bin Laden and the organization that became al-Qaeda had moved through Peshawar, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the Gulf; Pakistan remained a transit corridor, a place of regional intelligence liaison and eventual sanctuary. A September 12 presidential brief carried an unverified claim that he had moved from Kandahar toward Kabul. The Army's official history says CIA still could not pinpoint him during the opening campaign. The trail firmed at Tora Bora in December, where all-source reporting placed him before he escaped across the Pakistani border the

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
campaign had failed to seal.¹⁶ The military received an Afghanistan-centered mission built from a cross-border intelligence problem.

Iraq repeated the structure on a larger scale. Stockpiled weapons of mass destruction, renewed nuclear and missile capacity, and an operational Iraq-al-Qaeda relationship were presented as a converging threat. Benjamin Netanyahu publicly reinforced that case in televised congressional testimony on September 12, 2002.¹⁷ Later investigations dismantled central portions of the picture the military had been sent to act upon. Afghanistan turned a cross-border intelligence problem into a country-shaped mission; Iraq turned disputed and qualified intelligence into a second country-shaped war.

In February 2011, Michael Hastings reported that an information-operations team in Afghanistan had been assigned to study visiting American officials and build support for more trainers and money. Seven months later, on September 30, an American operation killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, in Yemen; President Obama publicly announced the killing.¹⁸ The government's legal memorandum substituted executive assessment for ordinary criminal adjudication: officials could determine that a citizen was an operational enemy, that capture was infeasible and that lethal force was lawful. Intelligence now supplied the predicate for extinguishing an American citizen's life without a trial.

PENTAGON WEARS THE SCARS

AFGHANISTAN • IRAQ • ANWAR AL-AWLAKI



[15] PBS FRONTLINE • INTERVIEW WITH CIA OFFICER GARY SCHROEN
 [16] 9/11 COMMISSION, CH. 2 • CIA SEPT. 12 PDB • U.S. ARMY AFGHANISTAN HISTORY • SENATE TORA BORA REVISITED • CIA CAMPAIGN HISTORY
 [17] HOUSE GOV'T REFORM • BENJAMIN NETANYAHU TESTIMONY, SEPT. 12, 2002 • SENATE INTELLIGENCE • PREWAR-INTELLIGENCE REPORT
 [18] PRESIDENT OBAMA • SEPT. 30, 2011 REMARKS • DOJ OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL • AL-AULAQI MEMORANDUM

SECTION 5

COUNTEROFFENSIVE



On May 26, 1999, the Joint Staff issued CJCSM 3500.08, its *Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*. J5 defined the desired end state and themes; J3 controlled product, priority, medium, dissemination agent and timing; J2 and J3 collected audience reactions; J3 and J5 measured effects and recommended branches or sequels; J6 supplied communications. Cancelled in 2004 and released two decades later, the guide makes one recurring sequence legible: select a story, place it in an environment, monitor the response, exploit the opening and assess what follows.¹⁹

Hastings reported a dispute over that machinery: an information-operations team attached to William Caldwell's Afghan training command researched visiting American officials-including senators-supported briefings and assessed message effects. Team leader Michael Holmes said the command sought support for more trainers and money; he acknowledged using public records, not deception or a specialized psychological technique. Petraeus ordered an inquiry, and the official investigation did not substantiate the allegation against Caldwell.²⁰

Flynn had already written the counteroffensive. In January 2010, he, Matt Pottinger and Paul Batchelor published *Fixing Intel* from inside the Afghanistan command. The system, they wrote, had become "only marginally relevant" to the strategy because it collected enemy organizations while failing to gather and distribute the political,

economic and social information commanders and civilian partners needed. Their remedy was outward-facing analysts, district assessments, regional "information brokers," lower-classification products, and Stability Operations Information Centers working with or replacing fusion centers. Inputs would come from civil affairs, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Afghan liaison, development organizations, human-terrain teams, infantry and psychological operations. This was a counteroffensive against Intelligence Community control over what became usable intelligence-and who could receive it.²¹

Petraeus publicly endorsed that diagnosis. Testifying before Congress in June 2010, he called Flynn's paper a "forthright assessment," said Flynn was in Afghanistan to fix the problem and described the resources and population-focused collection being added. Petraeus entered CIA in September 2011; Flynn took DIA in July 2012. For three and a half months before Petraeus resigned, the paper's author led DIA while its most visible military endorser led CIA.²² Syria made the split literal. An August 2012 DIA information report identified Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda in Iraq as the insurgency's major drivers and warned of a possible Salafist principality in eastern Syria. Flynn later called the choice to support that insurgency a "willful decision." The CIA armed anti-Assad factions; the Pentagon armed anti-ISIS forces. By 2016, U.S. officials described the two fighting one another.²²

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Washington already possessed an interagency system through which information and personnel could move. An August 2011 FBI-DoD memorandum governed information sharing, operational coordination and investigative responsibility. Defense investigators and analysts served inside FBI-led JTTFs; the clearest Navy rule left them under NCIS administrative control but FBI operational supervision. Joint-duty rotations moved analysts between institutions. Title 32 National Guard counterdrug personnel supplied thousands of staff-days inside state fusion centers under governors, state plans and drug-nexus limits.²³ These were authorized seats, clearances, requests and reciprocal details: a red-tape system able to move information-or stop it.

The legal rules governing foreign-audience material also changed. Section 1078 of the FY2013 defense bill, effective July 2, 2013, allowed State Department and international-broadcasting material created for foreign audiences to be made available inside the United States. It retained the prohibition on using those funds to influence American opinion and expressly did not apply to the Pentagon.³⁰ Yet DoD's 2003 *Information Operations Roadmap* had already noted that foreign-directed public diplomacy and psychological operations would often be replayed by news organizations and consumed at home.³¹ Foreign-directed messages could therefore reach domestic audiences even where legal authorities differed.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE

THE SAME FOUR HANDOFFS – COMPARISON BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND INTERAGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

01 / INTENDED FLOW

AFGHANISTAN / FIXING INTEL MODEL [21]

INPUT → ASSESSMENT → PRODUCT → USER

01 • COLLECT INPUTS

CIVIL AFFAIRS • PRTs
AFGHAN LIAISON • DEVELOPMENT
TERRAIN • INFANTRY • PSYOP
→ OUTWARD-FACING ANALYSTS

02 • ASSESS CONTEXT

DISTRICT ASSESSMENTS → BROKERS

03 • PACKAGE + DISTRIBUTE

REGIONAL INFORMATION BROKERS
+ STABILITY OPERATIONS
INFORMATION CENTERS → PRODUCTS

04 • SUPPORT DECISIONS

LOWER-CLASSIFICATION PRODUCTS
→ COMMANDERS + CIVILIAN PARTNERS

PRIMARY SOURCE [21]

- The analysts will provide all the data they gather to teams of “information brokers” at the regional command level who will organize and disseminate – proactively and on request – all the reports and data gathered at the grassroots level.

- These special teams of analysts and information brokers will work in what the authors are calling Stability Operations Information Centers. (The authors discuss how these Information Centers cooperate with, and in some cases replace, “Fusion Centers”.)

- These Information Centers will be placed under and in cooperation with the State Department’s senior civilian representatives administering governance, development and stability efforts in Regional Commands East and South.

- Leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted and hungriest analysts to serve in the Stability Operations Information Centers. These will be among the most challenging and rewarding jobs an analyst could tackle.

PROCESS RESULT [21]

FIELD CONTEXT BECOMES
USABLE INTELLIGENCE

PRODUCTS REACH COMMANDERS
+ CIVILIAN PARTNERS

02 / BROKEN FLOW

CIA • FBI • NSA / INVESTIGATIVE ROUTING [29]

INPUT → ASSESSMENT → PRODUCT → USER

01 • COLLECT INPUTS

NSA COLLECTS INFORMATION
→ PROGRAM REPORTING

02 • ASSESS CONTEXT

NSA COLLECTION → REPORTS

03 • PACKAGE + DISTRIBUTE

REPORTS → CIA + FBI
ANALYSIS + POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION

04 • SUPPORT DECISIONS

CIA → ANALYSIS
FBI → EVERY LEAD INVESTIGATED

PRIMARY SOURCE [29]

B. DOJ OIG’s Assessment of the PSP

In 2004 and 2006, the FBI’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) attempted to assess the value of PSP information on FBI counterterrorism efforts. Neither of these efforts represented a comprehensive assessment of the PSP’s value. The FBI conducted a more comprehensive survey of the impact of PSP-derived information, also in 2006. The results of these surveys are summarized in the DOJ OIG Report. Based in part on the results of one study, FBI management, including Director Mueller and Deputy Director John Pistole, concluded that the PSP was “of value.”

The DOJ OIG sought as part of its review to assess the role of PSP-derived information and its value to the FBI’s overall counterterrorism efforts. Director Mueller told the DOJ OIG that he believes the PSP was useful. Mueller said that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks and that to the extent such information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited. Mueller also stated that he “would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of hits.”

The DOJ OIG interviewed FBI officials, agents, and analysts responsible for handling PSP information about their experiences with the program. These assessments, more fully described in Chapter Six of the DOJ OIG’s report, generally were supportive of the program as “one tool of many” in the FBI’s anti-terrorism efforts that “could help move cases forward.” Even though most PSP leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism, many of the FBI witnesses believed the mere possibility of the leads producing useful information made investigating the leads worthwhile.

However, the DOJ OIG also found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents and analysts criticized the PSP-derived information they received for providing insufficient details, and the agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI field offices the DOJ OIG visited said the FBI’s process for disseminating PSP-derived information failed to adequately prioritize the information for investigation.

PROCESS RESULT [29]

HANDOFF LACKS DETAIL
+ PRIORITY

MOST LEADS HAD NO
TERRORISM CONNECTION
PSP HAD A LIMITED ROLE

[21] Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul Batchelor, Fixing Intel, January 2010.

[29] Inspectors General of DOJ, DOD, CIA, NSA and ODNI, Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program, July 10, 2009, pp. 1–11, 27–36; CIA Office of Inspector General, Review of the President’s Surveillance Program, Volume II, pp. 7–8.

SECTION 6


DISPOSE AFTER USE

VI

Hours before his death on June 18, 2013, an email from Hastings's account warned colleagues that federal authorities were interviewing people close to him and urged them to consult counsel before discussing their journalism. Staff Sgt. Joe Biggs, whom Hastings met while embedded with Biggs's Afghanistan unit in 2008, published an image and claimed a blind copy; colleagues confirmed their own copies, but his image did not display the BCC. WikiLeaks separately said Hastings contacted its lawyer. The FBI denied investigating Hastings personally, while its released file showed his Bergdahl reporting memorialized inside an international-terrorism investigation. Police and the coroner found an accidental high-speed crash. Biggs's claimed BCC remained unverified, leaving others to define the story after Hastings was gone.³²

Elimination does not always arrive as a bullet, a bomb or a covert operation. It can take the form of investigation, selective disclosure, media saturation, professional removal, prosecution, financial destruction or exile. Seven months before Hastings's death, Petraeus supplied the clearest nonphysical demonstration. The FBI inquiry began with Jill Kelley's complaint about anonymous messages traced to Paula Broadwell. Agent Frederick Humphries took the matter outside the ordinary chain on October 27, 2012, contacting Representative Dave Reichert, who connected him to Eric Cantor. Cantor's staff reached the FBI director's chief of staff by October 31. After Broadwell's final interview, FBI and Justice officials notified James Clapper on November 6. Clapper urged Petraeus to resign; the White House learned November 7, the President November 8, and the resignation came November 9. An email complaint had become an investigation, congressional disclosure, executive intervention, public saturation and removal. Six months later Petraeus joined KKR, rerouted into private influence rather than erased from history.³³

DISPOSE AFTER USE



SENATE RECORD • NOVEMBER 15, 2012

PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT, CHAIRMAN
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TOM COBURN, OKLAHOMA

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6276

Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kylan L. Davis, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director
November 15, 2012

Via Electronic Transmission

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. The Honorable Robert S. Muller, III

(6) a description of Department employee's contacts with Congress prior to the election and whether the Department considers those contacts protected whistleblower disclosures,

CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS BEFORE THE ELECTION

Grassley letter • FBI handling inquiry

HOUSE RECORD • NOVEMBER 13, 2012

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr.
November 13, 2012
Page 2

Intelligence James Clapper was notified at 5:00 p.m. on Election Day, November 6, 2012.⁴ President Obama was reportedly not notified until Thursday, November 8.

Accordingly, I write to seek clarification of the timeline of the investigation.

Please respond to the following questions and requests by November 26, 2012:

1. On what date did the investigation begin?
2. On what date did the investigation first implicate classified intelligence information?
3. On what date did the FBI first become aware of contact between Mrs. Broadwell and General Petraeus?

CLAPPER • NOV 6 / PRESIDENT • NOV 8

Inserted congressional letter • notification timeline

KKR RELEASE • MAY 30, 2013

BACK TO PRESS RELEASE

KKR Appoints General David Petraeus Chairman Of KKR Global Institute

May 30, 2013

NEW YORK (BUSINESS WIRE)– Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. today announced the appointment of retired four-star General and former Director of the CIA David Petraeus as Chairman of the newly created KKR Global Institute.

Henry Kravis, Co-Founder and Co-CEO of KKR, stated: "I have long known and respected General Petraeus and, on behalf of everyone at KKR, I welcome him to the firm. As the world changes and we expand how and where we invest, we are always looking to sharpen the KKR edge. With the addition of General Petraeus, we are building on the work we have done to understand the investment implications of public policy, macro-economic, regulatory and technology trends globally. We are pleased to bring all of this expertise together under one umbrella, the KKR Global Institute, to deliver the best of KKR's insights for our investors."

Over the past several years, macro-economic and geopolitical considerations, including the heightened role of central banks following the financial crisis, new regulation and major changes in public policy, have led to KKR's increased engagement on these areas and on environmental, social and governance issues. At the same time, KKR is a global firm investing in new and emerging markets that have new risks and opportunities. The KKR Global Institute will be the result of KKR's focus on the investment implications of these issues. It will also further build on the firm's efforts to help KKR's portfolio companies expand globally, and it will periodically serve as an outlet for publishing the firm's thought leadership products, including views from portfolio managers and industry experts.

As Chairman of the KKR Global Institute, General Petraeus will work with a team at KKR and in tandem with Kim Mehlman, Global Head of Public Affairs, and Henry McVey, Global Head of Macro & Asset Allocation. In addition to his role as Chairman of the KKR Global Institute, General Petraeus will also support KKR's investment teams in the alignment process, especially when the firm is considering investments in new geographies.

"KKR is one of the best investment firms in the world," General Petraeus observed. "I am very pleased to join such a great team. I have watched KKR evolve as it adapted to the post-financial crisis world and become a firm to watch for cross-sector portfolio. I look forward to supporting the investment teams in their pursuit of the best opportunities for clients, and also being a part of a new initiative to

PRIVATE-SECTOR REROUTING

Six months after resignation

[33] House Judiciary Committee, <https://www.congress.gov/113/chrg/CHRG-113hrg80973/CHRG-113hrg80973.pdf>; Senator Charles Grassley, <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-holder-mueller-answers-fbis-handling-petraeus-matter>; KKR, https://media.kkr.com/news-details?news_id=28fe16dd-234f-4c14-892d-fa6fb8909e95&type=1.

CONTINUED

Snowden embodied all three backdoors: contractor access to collection hardware, a personnel system carrying state access into private employment, and secret legal authority for mass surveillance. His disclosures changed the public record. The federal privacy board found no viable statutory basis for the Section 215 bulk-telephone program; the Second Circuit held that Section 215 had not authorized it. The government charged Snowden under the Espionage Act and with theft. The architecture remained; the man who exposed it became an exile.^{28 34}


Flynn moved from government reform into private national-security work. DIA retained his clearance after retirement, reaffirmed it in 2016 and suspended his access in February 2017, with no public announcements regarding that clearance thereafter. His disclosures placed him across cyber, data, defense, communications, consulting and investment firms; they named CNAS and the FBI as consulting-income sources without describing the work. Federal filings separately documented Flynn Intel Group's paid research-and-public-affairs campaign concerning Turkish interests.³⁵ He remained active in private national-security markets; because his FBI work is undisclosed, whether it carried his information-methods counteroffensive into the Bureau remains unresolved.

Biggs carried the purported Hastings BCC into an *InfoWars* career. Years later, his lawyers said he regularly supplied information to the FBI; the Justice Department then prosecuted and convicted him over January 6, and his seventeen-year sentence was commuted in 2025. At *InfoWars*, Jones provided the platform through which Biggs amplified the Hastings claim; Congress later subpoenaed Jones over January 6. A former *InfoWars* producer later said FBI agents met the team after its Mexico reporting and told them they were using its video as information.³⁶

Epstein-linked money helped finance Ehud Barak's investment in Reporty, later Carbyne, an Israeli emergency-data company. After Epstein died in federal custody under the official suicide finding, former CIA director Petraeus entered Carbyne's investor list. Released records show classified FBI handling of Epstein-related information and receipt from an unidentified external partner.³⁷ The methods differed-death, resignation, prosecution, exile and private-sector rerouting-but the outcomes remained the same: eliminated from public influence.

THE POST-9/11 NEXUS

AFGHANISTAN • CIA / DIA / NSA • BANNON / BREITBART • SCL / CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA • CARBYNE



- [21] FIXING INTEL: A BLUEPRINT FOR MAKING INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT IN AFGHANISTAN — FLYNN, POTTINGER & BATCHELOR; CNAS, 2010
- [22] DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN — HASC, JUNE 16, 2010; FLYNN BIOGRAPHY — DIA; DIRECTORS GALLERY — CIA
- [28] REVIEW OF THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF EDWARD SNOWDEN — HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, DECLASSIFIED 2016
- [35] AMENDED OGE DISCLOSURE — MICHAEL FLYNN; SCL GROUP ADVISER, NOV.-DEC. 2016
- [37] PINK BRANCH — EPSTEIN-BARAK, TIMES OF ISRAEL; PETRAEUS INVESTOR REPORT, TIMES OF ISRAEL 2021; SERIES C, CARBYNE 2022
- [37] VIOLET — EPSTEIN-BANNON SCHEDULE/TEXTS/INTERVIEWS, HOUSE OVERSIGHT + DOJ/AP; BANNON ROLES, OGE/FTC/BREITBART; SCL/CA, UK PARLIAMENT

CONTINUED

The people were removable; the system was not. On September 8, 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed the notice preventing Proclamation 7463 from expiring on its twenty-fifth anniversary. Filed September 9 and published September 10 as 91 FR 57773, it continued the emergency beyond September 14, 2026.³⁸ A catastrophe preceded by failures to move intelligence-and answered with claims for more control-left a state able to collect, watch, classify and act farther from ordinary process. Privacy and due process receded while the institutions controlling what intelligence traveled, and to whom, kept that control...

For 25 years.

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END NOTES

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- 5 Congress, Authorization for Use of Military Force, USA PATRIOT Act, and FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
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- 10 CIA, memorandum recording the State-chaired rollout meeting.
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END NOTES

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