NTOA’s Accountability Problem

Federal Reach, Local Access, and Repeated Security Failure

The prosecution has yet to reveal how Robinson came to know the UVU campus so intimately in only a few hours and without giving his significant relationships any reason to worry.

(Footnotes and contextual background in comments)

Disclaimer:

No public record proves that the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), or any person named here, engineered the security failures surrounding the 2024 Butler assassination attempt or Charlie Kirk’s 2025 assassination at Utah Valley University (UVU). The record does show a convergence worth investigating: NTOA writes national tactical doctrine, includes federal operators in standards work, trains federal agencies with federal money, and connects to Utah specialists possessing the expertise and professional access needed to design—or identify—exactly the kinds of gaps visible at both events. (1)

Capability, access, and recurrence are not proof of intent. They are, however, a legitimate basis to examine assignments, communications, financial relationships, and conflicts before more public money is committed.

The expertise and access network

Jason Mudrock chaired NTOA’s 2018 Tactical Response and Operations Standard review, served as Western Region director and Utah Tactical Officers Association president, taught mission planning and SWAT leadership, and documented coordination with federal tactical teams and FBI hostage-rescue instruction. (2)

Steven R. “Randy” Watt chaired NTOA’s Tactical Command Section and a SWAT standards committee; his résumé adds Army Special Forces command, FBI, DHS, NIJ and DOJ work, terrorism expertise, and security planning for the 2002 Olympics. It also records instruction at Utah Valley State College, UVU’s predecessor. (3)

Mike Ikemiyashiro remains an NTOA instructor in counter-ambush response, advanced patrol response and breaching, and serves in Utah’s statewide tactical association; no direct UVU role was found. (4)

Lane Critser led Utah County Metro SWAT for twelve years and says he developed its selection course, policy, training records and equipment processes while instructing local, state, federal and military personnel; he later became a tactical-equipment adviser. (5)

Mike Smith presents the clearest local–federal crossover. His résumé identifies him as a UVU alumnus, former **Pleasant Grove** police chief, Utah County Metro SWAT forward-operations commander and trainer, FBI National Academy graduate and Special Deputy U.S. Marshal. He now leads the Utah County Sheriff’s Office—headquartered in **Spanish Fork**—which DPS identified as a partner in the Kirk investigation. (6)(7)

Bruce Champagne documents NTOA membership, Utah tactical-association leadership, SWAT instruction, consulting and Utah County/**Pleasant Grove** training activity. (8)

These records establish expertise and network access. Except for Smith’s agency participating in the investigation, they do not establish that these individuals planned Kirk’s event security or entered its command structure.

The Butler comparison

NTOA’s 2023 standards committee included Patrick Young, identified as Beaver County ESU commander, and Michel Vasiladiotis, identified as a physician assistant with that unit. The bipartisan House report says Beaver County ESU supplied command, sniper and medic functions at Butler, while redacting individual names. It concluded that the attack was preventable and documented failures in planning, execution, leadership, command integration and roof responsibility. (1)(9)

That evidence does not assign personal blame to Young or Vasiladiotis. It establishes the narrower pattern: a unit containing national standards reviewers participated in an operation that failed in subjects those standards address. At UVU, the accused shooter allegedly reached an exposed firing position from a public walkway while six campus officers covered approximately 3,000 attendees. (7)(10) Again, the same professional ecosystem appears near a catastrophic result, but intent remains unproved.

Federal money and private interests

Federal support is substantial and traceable. USAspending records show two direct $1 million DOJ awards to NTOA for mental-health critical-incident training, one from COPS and one from BJA. (11)(12) A DOJ-funded policing initiative also reported a $168,108 pass-through subaward to NTOA. (13) Separate federal procurements include $99,360 obligated by ICE and two Secret Service purchases totaling $42,423 for Basic Command Certification. (14)(15)(16)

Those awards did not fund security at Butler or UVU, and payments for courses are not proof of institutional capture. NTOA’s “sponsors” are private corporations, not federal agencies. (17) But public funding, federal personnel on standards panels, and commercial relationships—including Utah officers moving into equipment sales or consulting—justify stronger disclosure and performance requirements.

What federal investigators should examine

The relevant record set is specific: pre-event threat and roof surveys; staffing and mutual-aid assignments; UVU–Turning Point USA–Orem–Utah County communications; contacts with NTOA or Utah tactical-association personnel; adopted NTOA policies and training records; instructor and reviewer selection; federal grant deliverables and evaluations; conference sponsorships; equipment demonstrations, purchases and commissions; and post-event reviewer conflicts.

A 2017 Utah County agenda, for example, records a proposed Sheriff’s Office agreement with L.N. Curtis/Curtis Blue Line, making the underlying agreement and vendor contacts appropriate subjects for disclosure—not evidence against any salesperson by itself. (18)

Assessment

The convergence justifies investigation because NTOA sells expertise in preventing and managing tactical failure while receiving federal support and cultivating unusually dense federal–local networks. Repeated failure does not prove deliberate design.

It does make deference untenable.

Future discretionary grants, contracts and official partnerships should be conditioned on independent performance audits, complete conflict disclosures and public after-action learning. If the records show no coordination or improper influence, that finding should be published; if they show that professional relationships displaced independent scrutiny, federal support should be reconsidered.