End of an Era, Part I: The Road to Hell

KENNEDY, CUBA AND VIETNAM

John F. Kennedy was dead, and the agency helping investigate his murder was deciding which parts of its own history investigators could see. The House Select Committee on Assassinations later found that Raymond Rocca, a principal CIA contact for the Warren Commission, did not know about the agency’s plots against Fidel Castro. The CIA had kept that information from the official assigned to help the commission. Investigators could ask him about the agency’s activities and still miss facts he had never been allowed to learn. ¹

CIA historian David Robarge later described Director John McCone’s approach as a “benign cover-up.” His account described efforts to keep the Warren Commission away from sensitive CIA operations, including the Castro plots. Concealing those operations does not establish responsibility for Kennedy’s murder. It does establish that the CIA helped steer the investigation while withholding information investigators needed to examine the agency’s own activities. ^{2 1}

The CIA’s Cuban operations included plans to help prepare the way for war. Operation Mongoose’s March 1962 guidelines called for developing resources inside Cuba that could prepare for and justify eventual American military intervention. The CIA was to conceal American sponsorship. Kennedy’s review did not authorize overt military force. The plan nevertheless called for covert action that could help create the conditions later offered as reasons to commit American forces. ³

Kennedy was also considering a reduction in Vietnam. On October 11, 1963, he approved recommendations that included withdrawing 1,000 American military personnel by year’s end. The McNamara–Taylor report called for completing much of the American training mission by the end of 1965, based on its assessment of progress. Whether Kennedy’s intentions contributed to his assassination remains unknown. His approval of the withdrawal recommendation is documented, preceding the decisions that vastly expanded the war. ^{4 5 6}

In August 1964, intelligence helped supply the public case for escalation. NSA historian Robert Hanyok concluded that the supposed second North Vietnamese attack in the Gulf of Tonkin had not occurred. His reconstruction described analysts excluding contrary evidence, combining unrelated messages and defending an initial mistake. In his account, almost 90 percent of the available signals intelligence—intercepted signals and messages—was kept out of the later summary. Hanyok did not find a White House order to fabricate the attack. He found that the people assembling the intelligence made the evidence fit the story they had already sent to their superiors. ⁶

The Warren Commission lacked information about the agency helping it investigate. Officials assessing Tonkin received an account distorted by the analysts who assembled it. Both failures left decision-makers without evidence that might have changed their minds. The officials who controlled the records could shape what other officials believed—and what they did next. ^{1 6}

COVERT FUNDING AND FOREIGN POLICY

Cold War competition also drew the CIA into organizations Americans knew as independent. A 1967 White House compilation reproduced earlier reviews of CIA support to the United States National Student Association and other international youth organizations, including the International Union of Socialist Youth. The stated purpose was to compete with communist organizations. The CIA’s anti-communism thus included secret support for selected socialists, depending on which groups could serve American policy. Participants did not all need to know who helped finance their organizations. ⁷

A contemporary State Department cable summarized reporting that the money passed through foundations, prominently the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs. After the arrangement became public, the Katzenbach committee recommended ending covert support to educational and private voluntary organizations, and Johnson accepted its recommendations. The restrictions followed years in which the CIA had used apparently independent organizations to pursue foreign-policy goals without publicly identifying itself as their sponsor. ^{8 9}

At home, the search for communist direction became a means of collecting information about Americans. Operation CHAOS began in 1967 under White House pressure to identify foreign influence over domestic dissent. The Rockefeller Commission described repeated CIA assessments that failed to find the suspected foreign control, even as collection expanded. In 1969, Helms sent Henry Kissinger a study while acknowledging that its domestic component fell outside the CIA’s charter. The commission later found improper domestic activity. The CIA kept collecting information about Americans even when its studies failed to find the foreign control the White House suspected. ¹⁰

Abroad, the CIA helped finance political messages through newspapers. The Senate’s Chile investigation recorded funding authorizations of $700,000 in September 1971 and another $965,000 in April 1972 for the opposition newspaper El Mercurio. Secret support for a newspaper gave a foreign government a way to influence public debate without putting its name on the message. This is along the history of psychological operations: influence the audience while concealing the sponsor. ¹¹

Watergate brought intelligence resources into domestic political abuse. The Rockefeller Commission documented CIA technical assistance to E. Howard Hunt and psychological profiles of Daniel Ellsberg. On June 23, 1972, Nixon instructed Haldeman to invoke the CIA and its Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba to discourage the FBI from following the burglars’ money trail. CIA deputy director Vernon Walters conveyed the warning to acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray, although Helms said he knew of no endangered CIA operation. The commission also recorded CIA refusals and found no knowing agency participation in the cover-up conspiracy. Nixon used a claim of national security as a barrier around a criminal investigation. ^{12 13}

The need to counter Moscow also supported decisions that benefited arms sales and intelligence access. In a 1968 interdepartmental review of a proposed $600 million, six-year military-credit program for Iran, a Joint Chiefs representative did not anticipate a Soviet attack in the near future. The group could not precisely match the amount of weaponry to a particular threat. Yet Iran’s intelligence cooperation and competition with Moscow remained arguments for support. American officials were weighing the access Iran offered alongside the weapons it needed. ¹⁴

Kissinger’s July 1972 instructions gave Iran more freedom to choose its weapons. Following Nixon’s talks with the Shah, State and Defense were to arrange briefings on advanced aircraft and weapons and provide additional American military technicians. In general, Iran would make the purchasing decisions, with encouragement to buy American equipment. The policy tied American reliance on an armed regional partner to business opportunities for American suppliers. ¹⁵

Washington was also planning closer ties with communist China. In June 1972, National Security Council staff member Richard Solomon proposed to Kissinger that a joint committee of the National Academy of Sciences, Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies manage scholarly exchanges. Cultural exchanges would use the National Committee on United States–China Relations, with the State Department arranging communications and security. The proposal would put respected scholarly institutions to work in a managed diplomatic opening. China’s communist government was no obstacle to designing those relationships. ¹⁶

American officials could secretly finance anti-communist political activity in one country while planning closer ties with communist institutions in another. Both approaches sought influence through selected partners. Some organizations received covert funding; others appeared in proposals for managed scholarly exchange. Officials were choosing which foreign relationships would receive American resources. Those choices invite a harder question than whether America’s leaders opposed communism: what access were they prepared to offer communist institutions to advance their own ambitions? ^{7 11 16}

Iran-Contra later exposed how dealings with a publicly opposed government could help finance another secret operation. Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh described the private Enterprise associated with Oliver North, Richard Secord and Albert Hakim: foreign companies, Swiss accounts and proceeds from Iranian arms transactions. His report identified at least $3.6 million diverted to the Contras. The administration’s dealings with Iran and its support for the Nicaraguan fighters had become connected through financial arrangements hidden from public scrutiny. Money from one foreign-policy operation helped sustain another. ¹⁷

CONTRACTORS AND COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Private industry had been helping organize government programs for decades. The original 1959 paper on PERT—a method for scheduling complex projects—joined Booz Allen authors with the Navy’s Special Projects Office in work associated with Polaris. Private specialists helped government plan the order and timing of its work. When intelligence agencies later sought commercial computing tools, they were extending an established practice of drawing on expertise outside government. ^{18 19}

After the Soviet Union’s collapse, one major surveillance dispute reached directly into everyday communications. The Clinton administration’s 1993 Clipper initiative proposed encryption with government-held pieces of an unlocking key, available under legal authorization. Officials argued that criminals and terrorists could use strong encryption to defeat investigators. Their proposal would build government access into the product before any particular investigation began. ²⁰

The industry resisted. NIST’s history records strong opposition and very low adoption of the proposed key-escrow arrangement. Clipper’s original design failed to win acceptance. Companies and other opponents had challenged an attempt to make government access a built-in feature of secure communications. ^{21 20}

Domestic terrorism renewed the pressure for access. In his April 1996 statement signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Clinton traced additional proposals to the Oklahoma City bombing and the law-enforcement requests that followed. He complained that Congress had refused expanded emergency and multipoint wiretap powers and removed provisions for easier access to records. His proposals against international terrorism had preceded Oklahoma City. He used both threats to press for wider access and portrayed Congress’s refusals as obstacles to protecting the public. ²²

The CIA also began working more directly with the companies developing new technology. Its 1999 annual report described In-Q-Tel, incorporated that February, as a way to obtain commercial information technology through relationships with private industry and academia. Intelligence requirements could now help shape which products received support and found customers. The agency could buy a finished tool or help develop one to suit its needs. A product could attract investment by serving both commercial customers and intelligence agencies. ¹⁹

While the CIA pursued commercial technology, its intelligence still guided military strikes. On May 7, 1999, American bombs hit China’s embassy in Belgrade. Tenet’s subsequent testimony described a CIA target nomination based on a mistaken location, reviews that missed the error and a late warning that remained unresolved before the strike. Some intelligence officers knew where the embassy was; the relevant databases did not. Tenet called the bombing accidental. His account showed that knowledge held inside the government had failed to reach the people who needed it before the bombs fell. ²³

In March 2000, former CIA director R. James Woolsey publicly acknowledged American spying on European industries. He described using computers to filter the collected information and defended collection aimed at bribery and other prohibited conduct. He denied stealing trade secrets for particular American companies. Instead, he described using intelligence to approach a government receiving a bribe and influence how it awarded a contract. Government officials could use secret commercial information to change a deal without handing it to a competing company. ²⁴

Confidential business communications can expose negotiations, dependencies and misconduct that outsiders cannot see. Woolsey described turning that knowledge into pressure over contract awards. Establishing how far intelligence agencies used wiretapping and cyberespionage to manipulate industry requires examining individual transactions. His account supplies a concrete example of the power at stake: secret access to a company’s business could give government officials a way to intervene in it. ²⁴

In-Q-Tel’s agreement with SafeWeb brought the agency into the business of Internet privacy. Announced in February 2001, it covered licensing and development of privacy technology. In-Q-Tel said it then had no ownership stake, board seat or management role. It could work with the company through a development agreement, helping adapt a commercial capability to intelligence needs without owning or managing the business. ²⁵

CYBERATTACKS AND SURVEILLANCE IN 2001

Before September 11, the CIA and Defense Department disagreed over an armed Predator: who would pay, who would operate it and who would take responsibility for lethal action. The 9/11 Commission described those disputes alongside unresolved technical problems, which it said largely determined the timing. The proposed aircraft could observe a target and attack it. ²⁶

Government computers were already being hit. According to a 2005 federal guilty-plea announcement, an intruder attacked Defense Information Systems Agency training computers in Denver around June 10, 2001, defacing pages and deleting logs. Networked computers were disabled for several days. In July, Pentagon spokesman Craig Quigley acknowledged Code Red infections on a small number of computers; he said classified systems and tactical operations were unaffected. GAO also reported that SirCam infected an FBI computer in late July and emailed private documents outside. The Defense Department was also a tenant on 7 World Trade Center’s 25th floor, according to NIST. The tenant list does not name a Defense office; the attacked training computers were in Denver. ^{27 28 29 30}

In July 2001, Code Red swept across Internet-connected computers. CAIDA researchers estimated that its July 19 outbreak infected more than 359,000 computers in under 14 hours. On August 4, a separate worm, CodeRedII, appeared. It left persistent backdoors on affected Windows web servers; restarting the computer did not remove them. On August 29, GAO told Congress that Treasury’s Financial Management Service had been infected and forced to disconnect from the Internet. Bank customers were also exposed through a separate breach of third-party purchase data. By early September, Riggs had notified 3,000 customers and First Virginia another 500 that their debit-card information had been compromised, Computerworld reported. Banks had to cancel and replace cards. These outbreaks and breaches were already underway when the September 11 attacks struck. U.S. securities markets reopened on September 17 after extensive checks of power, telecommunications and computer connections, as SEC chairman Harvey Pitt later described. ^{31 29 32 33}

On September 18, CERT warned of Nimda, which spread through email, infected websites and other routes. It also searched for backdoors left by CodeRedII and earlier attacks. The FDIC attributed unusually high September virus detections inside its firewall to Nimda. World Bank researchers also listed Deutsche Bank among Nimda’s September victims. In Japan, Associated Press reporting quoted Tsuru Credit Union spokesman Takao Ide saying its infected website had been shut and online settlements and transfers suspended. CAIDA continued monitoring Code Red activity into October, reporting no significant change from August until CodeRedII’s programmed October 1 shutdown. F-Secure documented another episode on October 11, when hundreds of Nimda-infected emails were sent worldwide. The attacks stretched from July into October, with later malware able to exploit access left behind by earlier infections. ^{34 35 36 37 31 38}

On October 4, 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the Defense Department, including the NSA, to conduct electronic intelligence collection aimed at preventing further attacks. The Justice Department inspector general later found that, during the President’s Surveillance Program’s first year and a half, only one Office of Legal Counsel attorney—John Yoo—was cleared to work on it. Keeping other lawyers out of the program also kept them from checking the government’s arguments for its legality. ^{39 40}

The inspector general called reliance on a single attorney extraordinary and inappropriate. Limited review had contributed to legal analysis that was, at minimum, factually flawed. Once additional attorneys gained access, serious objections emerged. As with the earlier investigative failures, officials could not properly examine information they were forbidden to see. Restrictions imposed around a surveillance program had weakened the government’s own legal oversight. ^{40 1}

ACADEMIC TIES AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE

American funding also supported academic relationships with China. Temple University reported a September 2001 USAID grant of $1.75 million to expand its rule-of-law program, with Tsinghua among the collaborators. Its newsletter described training Chinese judges and officials and helping China adapt its legal system to world trade. A later Congressional Research Service report documented USAID support for constructing and equipping Fudan’s Center for American Studies. Fudan identifies the Washington-based Fudan Foundation as the funding channel. The United States was deliberately investing in relationships with Chinese institutions as a way to advance American interests. ^{41 42 43}

Academic research also opened international relationships for disease surveillance. A 2011 evaluation prepared for NIH described Nathan Wolfe’s 2005 Pioneer Award and research that followed a group of people in Cameroon for signs of emerging disease. It connected that work to his subsequent Global Viral Forecasting Initiative and listed research locations including Cameroon, Congo, Madagascar and China. Researchers needed access to people, samples and information across borders to carry out the work. ⁴⁴

USAID’s PREDICT project, initiated in 2009, brought universities, aid officials and other organizations together to watch for emerging viruses. UC Davis’s One Health Institute identifies itself as the lead and lists USAID, EcoHealth Alliance, Metabiota, the Wildlife Conservation Society and the Smithsonian as core partners. Its account describes work primarily in Africa and Asia. A private company and several public and nonprofit institutions were participating in the same disease-surveillance project. ⁴⁵

On CNN in December 2011, Wolfe described the work directly: “we do surveillance, biological surveillance around the world.” Discussing pandemic prevention with Sanjay Gupta, he explained the difficulty of finding threats among large quantities of specimens and information. Researchers would gather observations across countries, combine them and look for signs of danger before an outbreak became a disaster. ⁴⁶

American organizations were also building partnerships with Chinese researchers. In September 2012, BGI announced its memorandum with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, combining its ability to study genes and read genetic sequences with the foundation’s health and agricultural programs. This was a separate agreement from Wolfe’s work and PREDICT. Together, these records show how research partnerships created continuing contact across national boundaries that security officials also treated as lines of strategic competition. ^{47 44 45}

METABIOTA, INVESTMENT AND INTELLIGENCE

Metabiota also attracted private investors. A preserved March 2014 Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners investment-committee email preserved among the published Hunter Biden emails described a proposed additional $250,000 investment that would bring the firm’s position to $500,000. The email records a proposal, not a completed transaction. It places investor interest in Metabiota alongside the company’s government and scientific relationships. ⁴⁸

By August 2017, In-Q-Tel’s relationship with Metabiota was public. An announcement hosted by In-Q-Tel said it and Munich Re, a company that insures insurers, had signed strategic agreements with Metabiota. In-Q-Tel investment partner Eugene Chiu highlighted “open source data fusion and sophisticated epidemic simulations.” That meant combining publicly available information and using computer models to explore possible outbreaks. In-Q-Tel was backing the data and software side of biological surveillance. ⁴⁹

The same announcement described software to estimate how often epidemics might strike, how long they might last, and their likely severity and cost. Insurers could use the results to price and manage risk; governments could use them to assess preparedness. Metabiota turned information about disease into a commercial product. Intelligence, public-health and insurance organizations could use the same software to make decisions that served their different interests. ⁴⁹

Control over information repeatedly gave officials power over other people’s decisions. Investigators worked from the files they received. Military leaders acted on intelligence that others assembled. Officials could use confidential business information to pressure a government over a contract. Software could organize disease reports into warnings that customers used to make decisions. The people collecting and interpreting the information helped determine what those customers and officials saw—and what they might overlook. ^{1 6 24 49}

By September 2001, demands for more intelligence were already familiar. The attacks gave officials new grounds to seek wider access. Examining who gained that access, what they could do with it and who could check them leads from government offices to the companies building surveillance tools. Their contracts, technology and relationships with intelligence agencies are the subject of the next part of this investigation. ^{22 19 25 39}

Footnotes

1. 1. HSCA report, 1979: CIA cooperation with the Warren Commission

   Printed pp. 252–253, discussion of Raymond Rocca and Richard Helms.

   https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1d.html

2. 2. David Robarge, John McCone and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

   Studies in Intelligence, September 2013; release approved September 29, 2014; printed pp. 8–9, 12, 20. Derived from the 2005 McCone history.

   https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB493/docs/intell_ebb_026.PDF

3. 3. Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962

   FRUS document 314, paragraphs 1–4 and source note concerning March 16 covering memorandum.

   https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314

4. 4. National Security Action Memorandum 263, October 11, 1963

   FRUS document 194, p. 396, operative paragraph 2.

   https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d194

5. 5. McNamara–Taylor report to Kennedy, October 2, 1963

   FRUS document 167, pp. 337–339, section I.B.1–3.

   https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d167

6. 6. Robert J. Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish

   Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001; printed pp. 3, 26–28, 38, 44, 48–49.

   https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/gulf-of-tonkin/articles/release-1/rel1_skunks_bogies.pdf

7. 7. Rostow to Johnson with covert-action review chronology, February 18, 1967

   FRUS document 171, attachment paragraph d, p. 543; reproduced August 24, 1961 review.

   https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d171

8. 8. State Department circular on CIA student funding, February 15, 1967

   FRUS Public Diplomacy VII, document 132, paragraph 4, pp. 412–413.

   https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917-72PubDipv07/d132

9. 9. Katzenbach committee report, March 24, 1967, and Johnson’s response

   Document 144, attachment sections 1–2, pp. 445–449; March 29 acceptance in editorial note.

   https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917-72PubDipv07/d144

10. 10. Rockefeller Commission report, Chapter 11: Operation CHAOS

    June 1975, printed pp. 130–136 and 143–150; Helms cover memorandum reproduced p. 134.

    https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/intelligence/RockComm_Chap11_CHAOS.pdf

11. 11. Senate staff report, Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973

    December 18, 1975; pp. 8, 19, 27–29.

    https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-94chile.pdf

12. 12. Rockefeller Commission report, Chapter 14: CIA and Watergate

    June 1975; printed pp. 178–185, 199–203, 206–207.

    https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0005/7288237.pdf

13. 13. Nixon–Haldeman recorded conversation, June 23, 1972, morning

    Trial exhibit 1, printed pp. 3–8 and 16–17.

    https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/forresearchers/find/tapes/watergate/trial/exhibit_01.pdf

14. 14. Interdepartmental review of military credit for Iran, April 5, 1968

    FRUS document 277, record of March 21 and April 3 meetings, pp. 497–501.

    https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d277

15. 15. Kissinger instruction following Nixon’s talks with the Shah, July 25, 1972

    FRUS document 214, items 1–3 and final paragraph, original pp. 1–2.

    https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d214

16. 16. Richard Solomon to Kissinger, Possible Next Steps in Sino-US Relations, June 9, 1972

    FRUS document 229, section II.C, pp. 909–910; notes 4–5.

    https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d229

17. 17. Lawrence Walsh, Final Report, Chapter 8: The Enterprise

    1993 report, sections on the 1985–1986 Enterprise, foreign accounts and Iran proceeds.

    https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm

18. 18. Malcolm, Roseboom, Clark and Fazar, Application of a Technique for Research and Development Program Evaluation

    Operations Research 7(5), 1959, pp. 646–669; DOI 10.1287/opre.7.5.646. The cited material is the publisher abstract and author affiliations.

    https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/opre.7.5.646

19. 19. Director of Central Intelligence Annual Report, 1999

    In-Q-Tel section: incorporation February 19, 1999, commercial IT and CIA requirements.

    https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/report-99.html

20. 20. White House statement on the Clipper encryption initiative, April 16, 1993

    Full statement, especially law-enforcement rationale and key-escrow description.

    https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/04/1993-04-16-press-release-on-clipper-chip-encryption-initiative.html

21. 21. NIST cryptography history: key escrow and the Clipper initiative

    Key Escrow / Clipper sections, including adoption and 1996 committee discussion.

    https://csrc.nist.gov/nist-cyber-history/cryptography/chapter

22. 22. Clinton statement signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, April 24, 1996

    Statement paragraphs on February/May 1995 requests, Oklahoma City, wiretaps and stripped provisions; original Public Papers p. 630.

    https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-antiterrorism-and-effective-death-penalty-act-1996

23. 23. George Tenet statement on the Chinese embassy bombing, July 22, 1999

    Chronology of Events; Late Concerns About the Target; What Went Wrong?

    https://irp.fas.org/congress/1999_hr/990722-tenet.htm

24. 24. R. James Woolsey, Why We Spy on Our Allies, March 17, 2000

    Wall Street Journal commentary reproduced by Cryptome, then Linas; admission, computer filtering and trade-secret denial paragraphs.

    https://www.linas.org/mirrors/cryptome.org/2001.11.13/echelon-cia2.htm

25. 25. In-Q-Tel commissions SafeWeb for Internet privacy technology

    Announcement February 14, 2001; agreement dated November 30, 2000.

    https://www.iqt.org/library/in-q-tel-commissions-safeweb-for-internet-privacy-technology

26. 26. 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 6: From Threat to Threat

    Printed pp. 210–214, armed Predator discussion; notes 238–258.

    https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.htm

27. 27. U.S. Attorney, District of Colorado / DCIS, Venezuelan hacker pleads guilty to attacking Department of Defense computer system located in Denver, Colorado

    July 28, 2005 announcement; PDF p. 1, stipulated-facts paragraphs dating the DISA training-system intrusion to about June 10, 2001.

    https://media.defense.gov/2005/Jul/28/2001711084/-1/-1/1/vanezuelan_08205.pdf

28. 28. Reuters, Pentagon thwarts worm, reopens Web sites

    July 24, 2001; Craig Quigley statements on limited Code Red infections, classified systems and tactical operations; Susan Hansen restoration statement.

    https://www.chron.com/business/technology/article/pentagon-thwarts-worm-reopens-web-sites-2027514.php

29. 29. Keith Rhodes, GAO-01-1073T: Information Security: Code Red, Code Red II, and SirCam Attacks Highlight Need for Proactive Measures

    August 29, 2001 testimony; printed p. 4 / PDF p. 5, Treasury Financial Management Service paragraph; printed p. 5 / PDF p. 6, FBI SirCam paragraph.

    https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-01-1073t.pdf

30. 30. NIST NCSTAR 1A, Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7

    November 2008 report, final-revision metadata January 29, 2009; printed p. 9 / PDF p. 51, Table 1-1 and footnote, tenants as of September 11, 2001.

    https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-4d4c17460292ee57ef313f6491fa8d1e/pdf/GOVPUB-C13-4d4c17460292ee57ef313f6491fa8d1e.pdf

31. 31. David Moore, Colleen Shannon and Jeffery Brown, Code-Red: a case study on the spread and victims of an Internet worm (2002)

    PDF pp. 2–3, Background and Methodology; p. 5, Results A.1. Supplementary institutional chronology: https://www.caida.org/archive/code-red/ . July 12/19 and August 4, 2001 outbreak dates; monitoring continued into October.

    https://www.caida.org/catalog/papers/2002_codered/codered.pdf

32. 32. Dan Verton, Hacker forces some banks to cancel Visa debit cards, Computerworld

    September 10, 2001; opening reporting and statements by First Virginia CFO Rick Bowman, Riggs official and Visa about compromised third-party purchase data.

    https://www.computerworld.com/article/1337620/hacker-forces-some-banks-to-cancel-visa-debit-cards.html

33. 33. Harvey Pitt testimony on market recovery, September 20, 2001

    Closure, system testing and September 17 reopening paragraphs. Page modified September 21.

    https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/092001tshlp.htm

34. 34. CERT/CC Advisory CA-2001-26: Nimda

    Initial September 18, 2001; revised September 25; printed pp. 129–132, PDF pp. 133–136. Compilation revision/copyright are later.

    https://www.sei.cmu.edu/documents/508/2001_019_001_496192.pdf

35. 35. FDIC 2001 Program Performance Report

    Printed p. 54, PDF p. 56 of 76, Virus Detection; September 2001 reporting.

    https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/9521/fdic_9521_DS1.pdf

36. 36. Thomas Glaessner, Tom Kellermann and Valerie McNevin, Electronic Security: Risk Mitigation in Financial Transactions—Public Policy Issues

    World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2870, July 2002; printed p. 8 / PDF p. 13, Table 2, Deutsche Bank entry dated September 20, 2001, and note 14.

    https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/985681468739503889/pdf/multi0page.pdf

37. 37. D. Ian Hopper / AP, contemporary Nimda report, September 19, 2001

    Tsuru Credit Union spokesman Takao Ide’s statement about online settlements and transfers. Contemporary report recovered through indexed article text.

    https://thedailyrecord.com/2001/09/19/new-complex-worm-slows-in-united-states-but-other-countries-hit/

38. 38. F-Secure, Net-Worm:W32/Nimda

    Technical Details and History; the October 11, 2001 episode is reported at about 15:00 GMT. The page’s original publication and amendment dates are not established.

    https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/nimda

39. 39. DOJ release concerning surveillance authorized after 9/11, December 12, 2014

    Paragraph beginning On Dec. 21, 2013: October 4, 2001 authorization. Page updated February 5, 2025.

    https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-additional-documents-concerning-collection-activities-authorized

40. 40. DOJ Inspector General, semiannual report April–September 2009

    The Department’s Involvement with the President’s Surveillance Program section; report summary dated July 10, 2009.

    https://oig.justice.gov/archives/semiannual/0911/multi.htm

41. 41. Temple Law ESQ., Winter 2001–02: $1.75 Million Grant Expands Law School’s Program in China

    Page 1, opening article and continuation in adjacent column; grant September 2001.

    https://law.temple.edu/esq/docs/Temple-Law-ESQ-Winter-2001.pdf

42. 42. Thomas Lum, U.S.-Funded Assistance Programs in China, January 28, 2008

    CRS RS22663, p. 6, ASHA paragraph; p. 1 for stated democracy/rule-of-law purpose.

    https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080128_RS22663_3e9e89138bcb565b231aadccc449cc390eb96846.pdf

43. 43. Fudan University, Center for American Studies institutional page

    Institutional history, ASHA/Fudan Foundation paragraph; current page accessed September 6, 2026.

    https://iis.fudan.edu.cn/en/cas/list.htm

44. 44. NIH-commissioned evaluation of the Director’s Pioneer Award, July 22, 2011

    IDA/STPI report, Nathan Wolfe (2005), printed C-26–C-27, PDF pp. 148–149.

    https://commonfund.nih.gov/sites/default/files/Pioneer_Award_Outcome%20Evaluation_FY2004-2005.pdf

45. 45. UC Davis One Health Institute, PREDICT project page

    Project description beginning Initiated in 2009; core partner paragraph.

    https://ohi.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/programs-projects/predict-project

46. 46. CNN Anderson Cooper 360 transcript, December 21, 2011

    Sanjay Gupta discussion with Nathan Wolfe and Fran Townsend; Wolfe’s biological-surveillance description.

    https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/acd/date/2011-12-21/segment/01

47. 47. BGI–Gates Foundation memorandum announcement, September 25, 2012

    BGI issuer release, opening and collaboration paragraphs; signing September 24, 2012.

    https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/bgi-and-the-bill--melinda-gates-foundation-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-on-collaboration-for-global-health-and-agricultural-development-171139691.html

48. 48. Preserved John DeLoche investment-committee email, March 10, 2014

    Canonical row 221; full displayed image; separate email record https://bidenlaptopemails.com/primary-research/email/127038 ; original context https://gusquixote.com/threads/2023-08-10-1689455218264596480/index.html . The preserved email image was checked against a separately preserved text copy in the completed audit.

    https://gusquixote.com/media/twitter/1689455218264596480/F3ImexcXAAEflgI.png

49. 49. In-Q-Tel / Metabiota strategic-agreement announcement, August 22, 2017

    Complete announcement, Eugene Chiu attribution and commercial-platform description.

    https://www.iqt.org/library/munich-re-in-q-tel-select-metabiota-to-gain-deeper-insights-into-epidemic-risk-and-global-preparedness-for-infectious-diseases

50. 50. Tom Herbert, Who was Jamal Khashoggi?

    Paragraph identifying Jamal Khashoggi as Adnan Khashoggi’s nephew.

    https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/who-was-jamal-khashoggi-the-saudi-journalist-tortured-and-murdered-a3964576.html

51. 51. U.S. Treasury sanctions announcement concerning the murder of Jamal Khashoggi

    Murder of Khashoggi section: October 2, 2018 killing and identified Saudi participants.

    https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0038